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Abstract	  Scholars	  have	  compared	  China’s	  liberalization,	  inward	  FDI	  attraction,	  and	  export	  promotion	  policies	  to	  those	  of	  its	  “Asian	  Miracle”	  predecessors	  to	  assess	  China	  as	  a	  ‘developmental	  state.’	  We	  build	  on	  that	  literature	  by	  drawing	  a	  new	  but	  similar	  comparison:	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Chinese	  development	  banks	  have	  financed	  the	  globalization	  of	  China’s	  ‘national	  champion’	  firms.	  	  We	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  state	  finance	  in	  promoting	  China’s	  outward	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (OFDI)	  in	  comparative	  perspective.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  research	  question,	  we	  created	  a	  database	  of	  Chinese	  finance	  for	  OFDI	  and	  compared	  our	  results	  to	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  previous	  developmental	  states.	  	  We	  estimate	  the	  total	  value	  of	  China’s	  OFDI	  finance	  from	  2002-­‐2012	  at	  $140	  billion.	  As	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  OFDI,	  China’s	  lending	  is	  roughly	  three	  times	  55%	  higher	  than	  Japan,	  the	  previous	  global	  leader	  in	  OFDI	  finance.	  Like	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea	  at	  earlier	  developmental	  stages,	  China’s	  lending	  also	  goes	  overwhelmingly	  toward	  natural	  resource	  acquisition,	  though	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  degree.	  Unlike	  Japan	  or	  Korea,	  we	  find	  that	  China’s	  market	  entry	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  developing	  project	  expertise	  and	  supporting	  exports	  than	  it	  does	  with	  tariff-­‐hopping	  or	  outsourcing	  industries	  that	  are	  fading	  on	  the	  mainland.	  We	  identify	  two	  major	  reasons	  for	  China’s	  high	  (31%)	  ratio	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  total	  OFDI.	  First,	  China	  has	  a	  greater	  incentive	  to	  give	  OFDI	  loans	  than	  Japan	  or	  Korea	  ever	  did	  because	  its	  borrowers	  are	  state-­‐owned	  so	  it	  can	  more	  easily	  dictate	  how	  they	  use	  the	  money.	  Second,	  China	  has	  a	  greater	  capacity	  to	  give	  OFDI	  loans	  because	  it	  has	  significantly	  higher	  savings	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  than	  Japan	  and	  Korea,	  both	  today	  and	  especially	  during	  equivalent	  developmental	  stages.	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Introduction	  Numerous	  studies	  compare	  the	  policies	  behind	  China’s	  rise	  to	  those	  of	  its	  “Asian	  Miracle”	  predecessors,	  including	  liberalization,	  inward	  FDI	  attraction	  and	  export	  promotion.	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  less	  researched	  tool	  of	  outward	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (OFDI)	  promotion	  by	  state	  development	  banks.	  Starting	  in	  the	  1950s,	  Korean	  and	  Japanese	  policy	  banks	  gave	  billions	  of	  dollars	  in	  loans	  to	  “national	  champion”	  companies	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  overseas	  investment.	  In	  2003,	  Solís	  correctly	  labeled	  Japan	  the	  “undisputed	  leader”	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  (Solís	  2003b	  153).	  Today,	  Chinese	  state-­‐owned	  banks	  are	  loaning	  billions	  to	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  to	  invest	  abroad	  as	  part	  of	  the	  government’s	  ‘Go	  Global’	  policy.	  This	  paper	  compares	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  that	  of	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  today	  and	  during	  their	  ‘developmental’	  periods.	  	  We	  also	  consider	  the	  motives	  for	  the	  Chinese	  loans	  and	  compare	  them	  to	  Japan	  and	  Korea.	  Scholars	  have	  suggested	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan,	  the	  loans	  were	  designed	  to	  acquire	  primary	  resources,	  gain	  access	  to	  advanced	  technology,	  enter	  foreign	  markets,	  and	  outsource	  declining	  industries.	  The	  Chinese	  government	  and	  numerous	  scholars	  agree	  that	  China	  encourages	  OFDI	  mainly	  for	  the	  three	  former	  motives.	  These	  scholars	  base	  their	  arguments	  about	  the	  government’s	  motives	  on	  OFDI	  figures,	  which	  represent	  the	  priorities	  of	  China’s	  diverse	  companies,	  not	  the	  government’s	  intentions.	  We	  consider	  the	  state’s	  own	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  be	  a	  better	  indicator	  of	  its	  motives.	  Using	  our	  OFDI	  loan	  database,	  we	  evaluate	  both	  the	  sectors	  and	  motives	  behind	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending.	  	  In	  the	  sixty	  years	  since	  Japan	  began	  a	  period	  of	  unprecedented	  economic	  expansion,	  Korea	  and	  now	  China	  have	  used	  similar	  tools	  to	  achieve	  record	  economic	  growth.	  Scholars	  have	  documented	  the	  policies	  of	  these	  “Asian	  Tigers”	  and	  discussed	  the	  lessons	  their	  example	  sets	  for	  other	  developing	  countries	  (Wade	  1990;	  World	  Bank	  1993;	  Krugman	  1994;	  Stiglitz	  1996;	  Amsden	  2001).	  While	  other	  East	  Asian	  countries	  have	  achieved	  high	  growth,	  the	  state-­‐led	  industrialization	  strategies	  of	  Japan,	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  bear	  the	  strongest	  similarities	  to	  China’s	  strategy	  today	  (Perkins	  1994).	  Yet	  today,	  as	  China	  shatters	  records	  for	  sustained	  growth,	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  fails	  to	  draw	  parallels	  back	  to	  these	  examples.	  	  Scholars	  have	  documented	  how	  the	  Asian	  Tigers	  used	  the	  state	  to	  coordinate	  a	  structural	  shift	  toward	  industrialization.	  They	  show	  that	  Japan,	  Korea,	  and	  Taiwan	  gradually	  liberalized	  trade,	  investment,	  and	  finally	  capital	  markets	  after	  using	  state	  policy	  to	  achieve	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  industrialization	  and	  per	  capita	  income	  (Johnson	  1982;	  Wade	  1990;	  Amsden	  1992;	  Amsden	  2007).	  Alongside	  industrial	  policy	  and	  gradual	  liberalization,	  the	  Asian	  Tigers	  gave	  strong	  state	  financial	  support	  to	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“national	  champion”	  companies	  to	  groom	  them	  for	  international	  competition.	  Since	  infant	  Asian	  industries	  could	  not	  compete	  with	  Western	  companies,	  the	  governments	  of	  Japan,	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  launched	  two-­‐pronged	  strategies	  of	  protection	  and	  promotion.	  They	  protected	  domestic	  exporters	  in	  capital-­‐intensive	  industries	  through	  import	  tariffs,	  foreign	  exchange	  controls,	  and	  in	  Japan’s	  case	  direct	  blocks	  on	  foreign	  investment	  (Johnson	  1982).	  The	  governments	  also	  purchased	  technology	  licenses	  to	  learn	  from	  more	  advanced	  economies	  (Komiya	  et	  al	  1988).	  In	  exchange	  for	  the	  loans,	  they	  required	  and	  incentivized	  borrowers	  to	  export	  in	  order	  to	  force	  them	  to	  become	  competitive	  (Amsden	  1989;	  Lawrence	  and	  Weinstein	  1999).	  Scholars	  disagree	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Asian	  Tigers’	  active	  efforts	  to	  support	  national	  champions	  contributed	  to	  the	  success	  of	  these	  industries	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  such	  policy	  played	  some	  role	  (Galenson	  1979;	  Amsden	  1989;	  Wade	  1990;	  Lawrence	  and	  Weinstein	  1999;	  Ozawa	  1999).	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  undisputedly	  important	  feature	  of	  state	  promotion	  was	  subsidized	  finance	  for	  these	  national	  champions.	  Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  critical	  studies	  on	  the	  role	  of	  industrial	  policy	  in	  the	  East	  Asian	  Miracle	  singled	  out	  subsidized	  credit	  as	  being	  the	  only	  successful	  policy	  in	  state-­‐led	  industrialization	  in	  the	  region	  (World	  Bank	  1993).	  	  Japan	  offered	  its	  industrial	  exporters	  funding	  through	  the	  Japan	  Development	  Bank	  (JDB)	  and	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  of	  Japan	  (JEXIM).	  JDB	  and	  JEXIM	  focused	  their	  financing	  on	  “rationalization,”	  or	  merging	  domestic	  companies	  to	  create	  national	  champions	  that	  would	  gain	  efficiency	  through	  reorganization	  and	  economies	  of	  scale	  (Johnson	  1982).	  Korea	  went	  further,	  nationalizing	  all	  banks.	  It	  created	  the	  Korea	  Development	  Bank	  (KDB)	  and	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  of	  Korea	  (KEXIM)	  to	  support	  the	  textile,	  steel	  and	  shipbuilding	  industries.	  Since	  Korea	  could	  not	  afford	  as	  much	  subsidized	  finance	  as	  Japan,	  KDB	  and	  KEXIM	  arranged	  and	  guaranteed	  foreign	  loans	  (Amsden	  1989;	  Stern	  1995).	  In	  Taiwan,	  the	  government	  also	  offered	  substantial	  amounts	  of	  concessional	  credit	  to	  exporters	  (Wade	  1990).	  Western	  countries	  recognized	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  these	  national	  champion	  export	  subsidies	  for	  developing	  nations	  and	  thus	  sought	  to	  ban	  them.	  Under	  the	  Washington	  Consensus,	  Western	  nations	  argued	  that	  eliminating	  restrictions	  on	  free	  trade	  would	  benefit	  the	  world	  economy.	  Once	  the	  Asian	  Tigers	  began	  taking	  market	  share	  away	  from	  the	  West	  in	  industries	  like	  steel	  and	  shipbuilding,	  Western	  leaders	  began	  pressuring	  them	  to	  end	  the	  export	  subsidies.	  By	  the	  1970s,	  Japan	  and	  Taiwan	  were	  under	  substantial	  pressure	  to	  end	  these	  subsidies	  (Komiya	  1988	  317;	  Wade	  1990	  96).	  Since	  Korea	  emerged	  later,	  the	  West	  was	  even	  quicker	  to	  challenge	  its	  subsidies	  (Perkins	  1994;	  Amsden	  2007).	  Beginning	  in	  1975,	  developed	  countries	  agreed	  to	  ban	  subsidized	  export	  loans	  through	  the	  Organization	  of	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  (OECD)	  (Moravcsik	  1989).	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At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  leading	  economic	  powers	  have	  largely	  ignored	  another	  tool	  of	  the	  Asian	  Miracle:	  government	  funding	  for	  outward	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (OFDI).	  Europe	  and	  the	  U.S.	  have	  occasionally	  toyed	  with	  public	  financial	  support	  for	  companies	  that	  invest	  abroad.	  But	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  identifying	  the	  right	  companies	  to	  support,	  scholars	  have	  shown	  that	  overseas	  investment	  support	  suffers	  from	  moral	  hazard,	  since	  governments	  are	  unable	  to	  force	  companies	  to	  use	  the	  funds	  to	  follow	  government	  priorities	  (Safarian	  1993,	  Solís	  2003b	  156).	  Governments	  worry	  that	  companies	  will	  use	  this	  support	  to	  move	  jobs	  and	  profits	  overseas	  (Ahn	  2005).	  Why	  pay	  a	  company	  to	  remove	  value	  from	  your	  economy?	  Japan	  became	  a	  pioneer	  in	  government-­‐subsidized	  OFDI	  in	  the	  1950s,	  with	  little	  competition.	  Even	  before	  the	  government	  liberalized	  OFDI	  in	  the	  1960s,	  the	  government	  began	  to	  offer	  subsidized	  loans	  to	  companies	  investing	  abroad.	  In	  1953,	  it	  started	  a	  branch	  of	  JEXIM	  focused	  on	  OFDI,	  which	  gave	  almost	  $70	  billion	  by	  1999.	  Solís	  argued	  in	  2003	  that	  “No	  other	  country	  in	  the	  world	  is	  as	  active	  as	  Japan	  in	  financing	  its	  corporations’	  foreign	  investment”	  (2003a	  103).	  Indeed,	  while	  Japan’s	  OFDI	  lending	  continues	  today,	  other	  nations	  have	  displayed	  little	  interest	  in	  this	  strategy.	  While	  Japan’s	  public	  FDI	  financing	  comprised	  10.3%	  of	  its	  total	  OFDI	  from	  1953	  to	  1999,	  the	  German	  equivalent	  of	  JEXIM	  has	  contributed	  OFDI	  financing	  equivalent	  to	  only	  0.53%	  of	  German	  OFDI.	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  Overseas	  Private	  Investment	  Corporation	  (OPIC)	  is	  explicitly	  prohibited	  from	  lending	  in	  support	  of	  OFDI	  that	  might	  hurt	  American	  employment	  or	  exports.	  As	  a	  result,	  OPIC’s	  OFDI	  financing	  comprises	  0.08%	  of	  American	  OFDI	  (Solís	  2003b	  156).	  There	  are	  no	  WTO	  or	  OECD	  rules	  limiting	  public	  OFDI	  financing.	  While	  Japan	  leads,	  most	  of	  the	  world	  wonders	  why	  the	  Japanese	  would	  possibly	  want	  to	  pay	  companies	  to	  outsource	  jobs.	  	  With	  time,	  Japan’s	  leadership	  in	  this	  area	  has	  only	  grown.	  Japan	  Bank	  of	  International	  Cooperation	  (JBIC),	  the	  successor	  to	  JDB,	  has	  evolved	  from	  almost	  entirely	  giving	  export	  credits	  in	  1950	  to	  giving	  74%	  OFDI	  loans	  in	  2012	  (JBIC	  2013	  12).	  When	  Japan	  met	  its	  “lost	  decade”	  in	  the	  1990s,	  many	  critics	  in	  Japan	  railed	  against	  the	  hollowing-­‐out	  of	  Japanese	  industry	  (kudoka)	  that	  resulted	  from	  outsourcing	  labor-­‐intensive	  production	  (Solís	  2003a	  106).	  But	  rather	  than	  backing	  off	  of	  FDI	  funding,	  the	  government	  broadened	  FDI	  loans	  to	  small	  and	  medium	  enterprises	  (Solís	  2003a	  116).	  The	  Korean	  state	  has	  also	  backed	  OFDI,	  though	  less	  enthusiastically	  than	  Japan.	  From	  1976	  to	  1999,	  KEXIM’s	  OFDI	  loans	  comprised	  9%	  of	  Korea’s	  total	  OFDI,	  only	  1.3%	  short	  of	  Japan	  (Solís	  2004	  16).	  However,	  the	  Korean	  figure	  is	  high	  largely	  because	  total	  OFDI	  is	  low.	  In	  1995,	  nine	  years	  after	  the	  state	  relaxed	  its	  grip	  on	  OFDI	  controls,	  FDI	  as	  a	  percent	  of	  GDP	  was	  only	  2.24%,	  versus	  6%	  in	  Japan	  and	  9.8%	  in	  the	  U.S.	  (Solís	  2004	  214).	  The	  9%	  ratio	  is	  due	  mainly	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Korea	  had	  little	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OFDI	  in	  the	  denominator.	  Most	  of	  the	  OFDI	  lending	  in	  the	  numerator	  was	  for	  scarce	  natural	  resources.	  By	  the	  1990s,	  OFDI	  lending	  in	  both	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  grew	  substantially,	  but	  it	  still	  lagged	  OFDI	  rather	  than	  leading	  it.	  Most	  OFDI	  came	  from	  Korea’s	  chaebol	  groups,	  since	  they	  were	  able	  to	  borrow	  enough	  funding	  internationally	  to	  invest	  abroad	  without	  help	  from	  the	  government.	  	  	  
Enter	  China	  It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  China	  has	  followed	  Japan,	  Taiwan	  and	  Korea	  in	  subsidizing	  capital-­‐intensive	  domestic	  industries	  and	  supporting	  national	  champions	  with	  export	  subsidies	  (Amsden	  2001	  281).	  Scholars	  have	  traced	  China’s	  state-­‐led	  industrial	  development	  and	  export	  strategy	  back	  to	  the	  legacy	  of	  Japan,	  Taiwan	  and	  Korea	  (Buckley	  2007).	  Scholars	  began	  using	  the	  phrase	  “China,	  Inc.”	  to	  describe	  China’s	  state-­‐led	  capitalism,	  just	  as	  they	  had	  used	  “Japan,	  Inc.”	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  and	  “Korea,	  Inc.”	  in	  the	  1980s	  (Downs	  2011;	  Pempel	  1987;	  Lee	  and	  Han	  2006).	  Just	  like	  in	  Japan	  and	  Korea,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  created	  China	  Development	  Bank	  (CDB)	  and	  China	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  (CHEXIM)	  in	  1993	  as	  two	  new	  policy	  banks	  that	  would	  lend	  according	  to	  government	  priorities	  rather	  than	  commercial	  success.	  	  CDB	  and	  CHEXIM	  have	  become	  the	  major	  forces	  behind	  China’s	  “Go	  Global	  Policy.”	  In	  1998,	  then	  President	  Jiang	  Zemin	  championed	  the	  internationalization	  of	  Chinese	  investment	  and	  lending.	  He	  argued	  that	  “Regions	  like	  Africa,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Central	  Asia,	  and	  South	  America	  with	  large	  developing	  countries	  [have]	  very	  big	  markets	  and	  abundant	  resources;	  we	  should	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  get	  in”	  (Chen	  2009).	  Scholars	  have	  shown	  that	  CDB	  is	  the	  main	  bank	  funding	  the	  overseas	  expansion	  of	  Chinese	  companies	  (Downs	  2011;	  Gallagher	  et	  al	  2012;	  Sanderson	  and	  Forsythe	  2012;	  Shambaugh	  2013).	  CHEXIM	  has	  also	  been	  a	  key	  player	  in	  China’s	  global	  financial	  reach	  (Bräutigam	  2009;	  Gallagher	  et	  al	  2012).	  Recently,	  China	  has	  also	  emerged	  as	  a	  major	  OFDI	  lender.	  As	  with	  Japan	  and	  Korea,	  China	  initially	  blocked	  OFDI	  to	  conserve	  foreign	  exchange.	  Through	  the	  1990s,	  the	  policy	  banks	  prioritized	  domestic	  lending.	  However,	  beginning	  in	  2001,	  Jiang	  Zemin’s	  Go	  Global	  policy	  expanded	  to	  encourage	  Chinese	  OFDI.	  The	  state	  created	  tax	  incentives	  and	  signed	  double	  taxation	  treaties.	  CDB	  and	  CHEXIM	  began	  backing	  this	  policy	  with	  large	  loans	  and	  lines	  of	  credit.	  In	  2004,	  Chinese	  authorities	  relaxed	  oversight	  restrictions	  on	  OFDI	  and	  OFDI	  exploded.	  Since	  2007,	  Chinese	  OFDI	  has	  averaged	  over	  30	  billion	  dollars	  a	  year,	  easily	  exceeding	  Korean	  OFDI	  during	  the	  same	  period.	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Scholars	  applying	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  Miracle	  to	  China	  have	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  public	  OFDI	  lending.	  First,	  this	  is	  because	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  is	  relatively	  new.	  But	  perhaps	  more	  significantly,	  public	  OFDI	  lending	  has	  received	  little	  attention	  and	  certainly	  little	  consensus	  as	  a	  “lesson”	  from	  the	  East	  Asian	  Miracle	  in	  general.	  It	  is	  not	  mentioned	  as	  a	  key	  strategy,	  and	  barely	  mentioned	  at	  all,	  in	  the	  studies	  of	  Japan’s	  economic	  miracle	  (Johnson	  1990;	  Ozawa	  1999).	  We	  begin	  by	  situating	  Chinese	  public	  OFDI	  lending	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  Miracle.	  	  
Estimating	  Chinese	  OFDI	  Finance	  
	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  estimate	  the	  size,	  composition,	  and	  terms	  of	  Chinese	  loans	  and	  lines	  of	  credit	  to	  support	  OFDI	  by	  domestic	  firms	  and	  we	  compare	  those	  estimates	  to	  figures	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  Japan	  and	  Korea.	  	  China	  does	  not	  publish	  disaggregated	  data	  on	  CDB	  or	  CHEXIM	  financing.	  Thus,	  we	  constructed	  a	  database	  by	  combing	  through	  English-­‐	  and	  Chinese-­‐language	  news	  articles	  like	  the	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  and	  the	  People’s	  Daily,	  company	  filings	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (SEC),	  government	  reports	  from	  both	  China	  and	  the	  host	  countries,	  and	  bank	  reports	  from	  CDB	  and	  CHEXIM—all	  documented	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  We	  include	  only	  loans	  that	  were	  confirmed	  by	  multiple	  reliable	  sources.	  We	  compare	  our	  Chinese	  lending	  estimates	  with	  Japanese	  OFDI	  loans	  from	  the	  Japan	  Bank	  for	  International	  Cooperation	  (JBIC)	  and	  Korean	  OFDI	  from	  KEXIM,	  both	  today	  and	  in	  historical	  context.	  Our	  China	  estimates	  should	  only	  be	  considered	  estimates.	  Neither	  the	  Chinese	  government	  nor	  the	  lending	  institutions	  publish	  official	  data	  on	  OFDI	  lending.1	  Unlike	  Japan	  and	  Korea,	  its	  lending	  is	  spread	  across	  multiple	  banks,	  making	  it	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  track	  down.	  It	  is	  also	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  between	  OFDI	  and	  trade	  finance.	  CDB	  and	  CHEXIM	  provide	  three	  main	  types	  of	  foreign	  lending:	  loans	  to	  support	  foreign	  governments	  and	  companies,	  trade	  finance	  loans	  to	  support	  China’s	  exports	  and	  imports,	  and	  loans	  that	  support	  Chinese	  companies’	  physical	  operations	  abroad.	  The	  two	  former	  types	  of	  loans	  have	  been	  catalogued	  for	  Latin	  America	  and	  Africa	  in	  previous	  research	  (Gallagher	  et	  al	  2012;	  Gallagher	  and	  Bräutigam	  2014).	  Only	  the	  latter	  qualifies	  as	  OFDI	  lending.	  	  Still,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  gray	  area	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  FDI	  loans	  and	  export	  finance.	  Chinese	  banks	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  CHEXIM	  did	  begin	  reporting	  “overseas	  investment	  loan”	  disbursement	  in	  2009	  (See	  Operational	  
Highlights	  section	  of	  CHEXIM	  Annual	  Reports).	  Since	  CHEXIM	  does	  not	  report	  commitments,	  define	  
“overseas	  investment	  loan,”	  or	  give	  examples	  of	  these	  loans,	  we	  used	  these	  numbers	  simply	  for	  ballpark	  
confirmation	  of	  our	  estimates.	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have	  lent	  billions	  to	  Chinese	  construction	  companies	  and	  their	  customers	  to	  build	  dams,	  ports,	  and	  telecom	  infrastructure	  abroad.	  We	  only	  count	  these	  loans	  if	  the	  Chinese	  firm	  is	  the	  owner	  rather	  than	  the	  contractor,	  since	  contractors	  are	  trading	  in	  goods	  and	  services	  rather	  than	  investing.	  However,	  we	  do	  consider	  loans	  supporting	  Build-­‐Own-­‐Operate-­‐Transfer	  (BOOT)	  projects	  to	  be	  OFDI	  loans,	  since	  the	  contractor	  will	  own	  the	  project	  for	  a	  significant	  length	  of	  time.2	  We	  report	  a	  lower	  and	  upper	  bound	  in	  addition	  to	  our	  main	  estimate	  because	  many	  of	  these	  loans	  were	  split	  between	  OFDI	  and	  other	  purposes.	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  loan	  was	  simply	  described	  as	  “to	  support	  the	  company’s	  Going	  Global	  strategy.”	  Since	  Jiang	  Zemin	  spearheaded	  China’s	  Go	  Global	  strategy	  in	  1998,	  global	  expansion	  has	  become	  a	  buzzword	  that	  every	  company	  tacks	  on	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  funding.	  Upon	  closer	  inspection,	  “Going	  Global”	  finance	  includes	  not	  only	  OFDI	  lending,	  but	  also	  the	  financing	  for	  contractors’	  customers	  described	  above	  and	  traditional	  export	  financing	  (as	  well	  as	  industrial	  restructuring	  and	  any	  domestic	  venture	  to	  become	  more	  internationally	  competitive).	  Often	  one	  loan	  will	  claim	  to	  cover	  all	  of	  these	  areas.	  We	  address	  these	  “all	  of	  the	  above	  loans”	  by	  giving	  a	  lower	  and	  upper	  bound	  to	  our	  estimates.	  The	  lower	  bound	  comprises	  all	  the	  lending	  that	  
included	  OFDI	  as	  a	  possible	  use,	  while	  the	  upper	  bound	  comprises	  only	  the	  lending	  that	  explicitly	  named	  OFDI	  as	  its	  single	  purpose.	  Thus,	  the	  lower	  bound	  includes	  all	  the	  lending	  that	  Chinese	  companies	  could	  have	  used	  for	  OFDI,	  while	  the	  upper	  bound	  includes	  only	  the	  lending	  that	  Chinese	  companies	  did	  use	  for	  OFDI.	  	  	   	   	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  One	  could	  complicate	  the	  boundary	  between	  loans	  and	  investment	  even	  further.	  Many	  loans	  
promote	  investment	  on	  the	  surface	  but	  support	  trade	  on	  a	  deeper	  level.	  If	  a	  car	  manufacturer	  
gets	  a	  “tariff-­‐jumping”	  loan	  to	  build	  an	  assembly	  plant	  overseas,	  the	  loan	  will	  directly	  support	  
overseas	  investment,	  but	  it	  also	  supports	  the	  export	  of	  car	  designs,	  assembly	  technology	  and	  
unassembled	  car	  parts.	  If	  a	  wind	  turbine	  manufacturer	  gets	  a	  loan	  to	  set	  up	  a	  wind	  farm	  
overseas,	  it	  will	  use	  the	  loan	  largely	  to	  buy	  its	  own	  exports.	  We	  attempt	  to	  draw	  a	  line	  that	  
mirrors	  the	  definition	  of	  overseas	  investment	  finance	  used	  by	  JBIC	  and	  KEXIM—finance	  with	  a	  
stated	  main	  purpose	  of	  supporting	  domestic	  companies’	  overseas	  investment.	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Bank	   Amount	   %	  of	  total	  
	  CDB	  	   $92,860	   64.32%	  
	  Ex-­‐Im	  	   $34,151	   23.66%	  
	  BoC	  	   $12,310	   8.53%	  
	  ICBC	  	   $770	   0.53%	  
	  CCB	  	   $475	   0.33%	  
	  Multiple	  	   $3,800	   2.63%	  
	  Total	  	   $144,366	   100.00%	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Chinese	  OFDI	  Finance	  by	  bank,	  in	  millions	  of	  $	  	  	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  1,	  since	  2002,	  we	  constrain	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  between	  a	  lower	  bound	  of	  $88	  billion	  and	  an	  upper	  bound	  of	  $192	  billion.	  Using	  a	  simple	  average,	  we	  estimate	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  at	  $140	  billion.	  As	  with	  China’s	  lending	  to	  foreign	  governments	  and	  companies,	  and	  despite	  CHEXIM’s	  public	  notices	  in	  support	  of	  OFDI	  lending,	  CDB	  provided	  the	  lion’s	  share.	  Gallagher	  et	  al	  (2012)	  find	  that	  CDB	  provided	  82%	  of	  Chinese	  lending	  to	  Latin	  American	  governments	  and	  companies,	  with	  CHEXIM	  adding	  12%.	  Our	  database	  of	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  revealed	  64%	  from	  CDB,	  24%	  from	  CHEXIM,	  and	  9%	  from	  the	  Bank	  of	  China.	  CHEXIM	  is	  better	  represented	  in	  OFDI	  lending	  than	  foreign	  lending.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  since	  CHEXIM	  issued	  a	  joint	  notice	  with	  China’s	  main	  economic	  planning	  agency,	  NDRC,	  that	  both	  bodies	  “will	  jointly	  set	  up	  a	  credit	  support	  mechanism	  for	  overseas	  investments”	  (NDRC	  2004).	  Still,	  while	  CDB	  has	  not	  issued	  notices	  on	  its	  OFDI	  lending	  policies,	  it	  provides	  2.5	  times	  more	  OFDI	  lending	  than	  CHEXIM.	  	  A	  recent	  company	  survey	  in	  China	  suggests	  that	  despite	  these	  large	  loans,	  companies	  primarily	  finance	  their	  overseas	  investments	  through	  retained	  earnings.	  China	  Council	  for	  the	  Promotion	  of	  International	  Trade’s	  2013	  China	  Outbound	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  Survey	  reports	  that	  only	  21%	  of	  foreign-­‐investing	  firms	  rely	  primarily	  on	  bank	  loans,	  while	  52%	  rely	  on	  retained	  earnings	  (Zhang	  2013).	  Thirty	  percent	  report	  using	  bank	  loans	  as	  a	  major	  source	  of	  funding,	  compared	  to	  70%	  for	  retained	  earnings.	  However,	  this	  survey	  polls	  thousands	  of	  private	  and	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  in	  China,	  mostly	  with	  revenues	  below	  $1	  billion.	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  later,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  China’s	  OFDI	  funding	  goes	  to	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (SOEs)	  with	  revenues	  over	  $10	  billion.	  Since	  the	  survey	  reports	  the	  results	  by	  number	  of	  firms,	  rather	  than	  by	  total	  revenue,	  its	  results	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  representative	  for	  our	  discussion	  of	  national	  champions.	  Still,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  remember	  that	  companies	  are	  using	  retained	  earnings	  to	  fund	  OFDI	  in	  addition	  to	  these	  loans.	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   Amount	   %	  of	  GDP	   %	  of	  OFDI	  
	  China	  	   139.9	   0.31%	   58.0%	  
	  Japan	  	   140.7	   0.26%	   15.6%	  
	  Korea	  	   37.1	   0.38%	   20.3%	  
	  
Table	  2.	  Chinese,	  Japanese	  and	  Korean	  OFDI	  finance,	  2003-­‐2011,	  in	  billions	  of	  $	  	  In	  Table	  2,	  we	  compare	  the	  quantity	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  today	  in	  China,	  Japan	  and	  Korea.	  We	  find	  that	  they	  give	  in	  roughly	  equal	  proportions	  to	  GDP,	  but	  China	  gives	  far	  more	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  OFDI.	  Since	  2002,	  we	  constrain	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  between	  a	  lower	  bound	  of	  $88	  billion	  and	  an	  upper	  bound	  of	  $192	  billion.	  Using	  a	  simple	  average,	  we	  estimate	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  at	  $140	  billion.	  Japan’s	  OFDI	  lending	  through	  JBIC	  since	  2002	  sums	  to	  $145.2	  billion.	  Korea’s	  OFDI	  loans	  plus	  guarantees	  through	  KEXIM	  since	  2002	  total	  $37	  billion.	  Since	  one	  would	  expect	  a	  larger,	  wealthier	  country	  to	  give	  more	  OFDI	  loans,	  we	  also	  compare	  these	  figures	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP.	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  comprises	  0.31%	  of	  GDP,	  while	  Japan’s	  comprise	  0.26%	  and	  Korea’s	  loans	  and	  guarantees	  make	  up	  0.38%.	  Loans	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  appear	  fairly	  constant	  across	  the	  three	  countries.	  Finally,	  we	  compare	  these	  figures	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  OFDI,	  since	  one	  would	  expect	  a	  nation	  with	  more	  OFDI	  to	  invest	  more	  in	  OFDI	  loans.	  China’s	  loans	  come	  to	  31%	  of	  total	  OFDI,	  Japan’s	  to	  16%,	  and	  Korea’s	  loans	  and	  guarantees	  to	  20%.	  China	  lends	  roughly	  three	  times	  more	  than	  Japan	  or	  Korea	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  OFDI.	  This	  looks	  very	  different	  from	  the	  GDP	  comparison,	  since	  China’s	  total	  OFDI	  comprises	  only	  0.6%	  of	  GDP,	  compared	  to	  1.4%	  for	  Japan	  and	  1.8%	  for	  Korea.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  our	  Korean	  OFDI	  figures	  are	  also	  imprecise.	  KEXIM’s	  Annual	  Report	  lumps	  together	  OFDI	  loans	  and	  guarantees.	  As	  a	  result,	  all	  of	  the	  KEXIM	  OFDI	  figures	  are	  overestimates	  because	  they	  include	  guarantees	  in	  addition	  to	  loans.3	  Our	  Japan	  data	  includes	  only	  OFDI	  loans,	  as	  does	  the	  China	  data.	  KEXIM	  also	  differs	  by	  recording	  disbursements	  rather	  than	  commitments.	  	  It	  appears	  that	  China	  is	  encouraging	  OFDI	  more	  proactively	  than	  Japan	  or	  Korea.	  We	  compared	  OFDI	  finance	  to	  total	  OFDI,	  as	  reported	  by	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  to	  the	  OECD.4	  China’s	  OFDI	  statistics	  are	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  acquire,	  since	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce’s	  official	  statistics	  show	  most	  OFDI	  flowing	  to	  tax	  havens	  rather	  than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  KEXIM	  also	  introduced	  a	  new	  OFDI	  loan	  category	  in	  its	  2012	  Annual	  Report.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  reported	  
$7.2	  billion	  in	  Overseas	  Investment	  Finance,	  it	  also	  gave	  $1.9	  billion	  in	  Natural	  Resources	  Finance,	  which	  
includes	  loans	  and	  guarantees	  to	  resource-­‐related,	  Korean-­‐held	  companies	  operating	  abroad	  (KEXIM	  
2012).	  
4	  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER	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actual	  OFDI	  destinations	  (MOFCOM	  2011).	  We	  used	  publicly	  available	  OFDI	  data	  from	  the	  Heritage	  Foundation’s	  China	  Global	  Investment	  Tracker,	  created	  by	  Derek	  Scissors.	  This	  database	  most	  likely	  overestimates	  Chinese	  OFDI	  since	  it	  includes	  portfolio	  investment	  and	  reports	  publicly	  announced	  commitments	  rather	  than	  actual	  disbursements	  (Bräutigam	  2013).	  Though	  Japan	  was	  the	  “undisputed	  leader”	  in	  OFDI	  loans	  in	  2003	  (Solís	  2003b	  153),	  today	  China	  gives	  at	  least	  55%	  more	  OFDI	  finance	  per	  dollar	  of	  OFDI.	  From	  2002	  to	  2012,	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  comprised	  31%	  of	  total	  OFDI,	  in	  contrast	  to	  16%	  for	  Japan	  and	  20%	  for	  Korea.	  In	  addition,	  since	  our	  OFDI	  total	  is	  an	  overestimate,	  this	  31%	  ratio	  should	  be	  considered	  an	  underestimate.	  China’s	  high	  loan-­‐to-­‐OFDI	  ratio	  suggests	  that	  the	  state	  banks	  are	  more	  invested	  in	  encouraging	  OFDI	  than	  the	  companies	  themselves.	  This	  makes	  sense	  in	  today’s	  world,	  where	  South	  Korea	  and	  Japan’s	  firms	  have	  grown	  out	  of	  their	  ‘infancy’	  and	  can	  finance	  their	  expansion	  without	  government	  support	  through	  international	  capital	  markets.	  It	  seems	  more	  appropriate	  to	  compare	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  today	  with	  that	  of	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  when	  they	  were	  at	  equivalent	  stages	  of	  development.	  China’s	  OFDI	  encouragement	  makes	  sense,	  since	  Chinese	  companies	  have	  relatively	  little	  experience	  investing	  abroad	  and	  need	  subsidized	  loans	  to	  make	  the	  leap.	  Japanese	  and	  Korean	  companies,	  by	  contrast,	  do	  not	  need	  the	  help.	  They	  have	  already	  built	  global	  supply	  chains,	  acquiring	  natural	  resources	  and	  shipping	  to	  cheap-­‐labor	  assembly	  plants.	  Indeed,	  JBIC’s	  predecessor	  Japan	  Development	  Bank	  gave	  enormous	  subsidies	  to	  the	  infant	  shipbuilding	  and	  computer	  manufacturing	  industries.	  Today,	  we	  find	  little	  evidence	  of	  state	  support	  for	  these	  industries	  because	  the	  state	  removed	  the	  subsidies	  as	  they	  became	  globally	  competitive	  (Shinjo	  1988;	  Yonezawa	  1988).	  If	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  ever	  mirrored	  China’s	  heavy	  OFDI	  push,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  decades	  ago.	  	  
	  	   Amount	   %	  of	  GDP	   %	  of	  OFDI	  
	  China	  	   139.9	   0.31%	   58.0%	  
	  Japan,	  1971-­‐1984	  	   8.4	   0.08%	   12.2%	  
	  
Table	  3.	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese	  OFDI	  finance	  during	  industrialization.	  	  	  When	  comparing	  China’s	  OFDI	  today	  to	  that	  of	  Japan	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  Korea	  in	  the	  1980s,	  we	  find	  that	  China	  still	  stands	  out.	  First,	  we	  compare	  China’s	  2002-­‐2012	  period	  with	  Japan	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  when	  it	  had	  equivalent	  per	  capita	  GDP.	  Japan’s	  OFDI	  lending	  as	  a	  percent	  of	  GDP	  was	  0.08%,	  or	  roughly	  a	  fourth	  of	  China’s	  0.31%.	  As	  Solís	  (2004)	  discusses,	  Japan	  engaged	  in	  little	  OFDI	  before	  1972.	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China	  started	  lending	  in	  earnest	  by	  2003,	  a	  few	  years	  shy	  of	  reaching	  the	  same	  per	  capita	  GDP	  as	  Japan	  in	  1972.	  Japan’s	  OFDI	  in	  1972-­‐1973	  easily	  exceeded	  total	  OFDI	  from	  the	  previous	  two	  decades	  (Solís	  2004	  42).	  But	  even	  in	  1973,	  when	  Japan	  gave	  its	  largest	  OFDI	  finance	  push	  of	  the	  century	  in	  response	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  system	  and	  the	  oil	  crisis,	  OFDI	  lending	  only	  reached	  0.20%	  of	  GDP.5	  The	  ratio	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  OFDI	  increased	  from	  10%	  in	  1972	  to	  18%	  in	  1973	  and	  20%	  in	  1974.	  For	  the	  periods	  1951-­‐1970	  and	  1971-­‐1984,	  Japanese	  OFDI	  lending	  reached	  12%	  of	  total	  OFDI.	  This	  ratio	  decreased	  to	  9%	  from	  1985-­‐1999.6	  Korean	  OFDI	  lending	  similarly	  comprised	  9%	  of	  total	  OFDI	  from	  1976	  to	  1999	  (Solís	  2004	  16).	  All	  of	  these	  percentages	  are	  dwarfed	  by	  modern-­‐day	  China’s	  31%	  average.	  	  As	  more	  companies	  follow	  the	  Chinese	  state’s	  enthusiastic	  lead,	  we	  expect	  Chinese	  OFDI	  to	  greatly	  increase.	  Japan’s	  lending	  history	  suggests	  that	  OFDI	  lending	  pushes	  do	  increase	  OFDI.	  Solís	  (2003a)	  demonstrates	  that	  Japan’s	  manufacturing	  OFDI	  loans	  in	  the	  1960s	  through	  the	  1980s	  resulted	  in	  corresponding	  increases	  in	  manufacturing	  OFDI.	  If	  OFDI	  lending	  translates	  to	  OFDI	  in	  China	  as	  well,	  it	  will	  cause	  OFDI	  to	  grow.	  We	  expect	  that	  it	  will	  happen,	  since	  Reform	  and	  Opening	  has	  required	  Chinese	  companies	  to	  act	  boldly	  upon	  perceived	  shifts	  in	  state	  policy.	  Just	  as	  city	  governments	  used	  Deng	  Xiaoping’s	  Southern	  Tour	  to	  justify	  economic	  reforms,	  companies	  endlessly	  cite	  “Going	  Global”	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  their	  international	  ambitions.	  With	  the	  state	  pushing	  OFDI	  so	  strongly,	  it	  seems	  inevitable	  that	  companies	  will	  recognize	  the	  push	  and	  join	  the	  bandwagon.	  	  	  	  	  
Country	   Borrower	   Rate	   Year	  
	  Japan	  	   	  Yen	  rate	  	   0.88%	   2011	  
	  China	  	   	  Chinalco	  	   L+0.01%	   2008	  
	  Japan	  	   	  $	  rate	  	   L+0.25%	   2010	  
	  Japan	  	   	  $	  rate	  	   L+0.44%	   2004	  
	  China	  	   	  TCL	  	   L+0.6%	   2004	  
	  Japan	  	   	  Yen	  rate	  	   2.50%	   2005	  
	  China	  	   	  Huawei	  	   L+2%	   2009	  
	  China	  	   	  CNOOC	  	   4.05%	   2006	  
	  
Table	  4.	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese	  interest	  rates	  on	  OFDI	  loans	  (L=LIBOR)	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Calculated	  with	  data	  in	  Solís	  2004	  (40)	  and	  other	  data	  compiled	  by	  Solís.	  
6	  Calculated	  with	  data	  in	  Solís	  2004	  (40)	  and	  other	  data	  compiled	  by	  Solís.	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We	  also	  compared	  the	  interest	  rates	  on	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese	  OFDI	  loans,	  finding	  that	  while	  both	  Japan	  and	  China	  subsidize	  their	  loans,	  Japan’s	  rates	  may	  be	  lower	  on	  average.	  We	  were	  able	  to	  find	  a	  few	  Chinese	  OFDI	  loan	  interest	  rates	  through	  interviews	  and	  newspaper	  articles.	  At	  the	  high	  end,	  China	  National	  Overseas	  Oil	  Corporation	  (CNOOC)	  reportedly	  took	  out	  a	  4.05%	  fixed-­‐rate	  loan	  in	  2006.	  At	  the	  low	  end,	  Chinalco	  paid	  0.01%	  over	  LIBOR,	  the	  rate	  that	  banks	  charge	  each	  other,	  for	  a	  loan	  in	  2008.	  CNOOC’s	  loan	  is	  not	  particularly	  cheap,	  while	  Chinalco	  is	  essentially	  paying	  the	  lowest	  possible	  rate.	  We	  found	  interest	  rates	  on	  similar	  Chinese	  loans	  as	  well—export	  loans	  to	  telecom	  and	  infrastructure	  companies.	  Huawei	  and	  TCL	  paid	  spreads	  over	  LIBOR	  of	  2%	  and	  0.6%	  in	  2009	  and	  2004,	  respectively.	  The	  former	  is	  a	  fairly	  typical	  commercial	  rate,	  while	  the	  latter	  is	  clearly	  subsidized.	  By	  contrast,	  JBIC’s	  reported	  OFDI	  loan	  interest	  rates	  all	  appear	  subsidized.7	  Over	  the	  past	  decade,	  its	  rates	  range	  from	  0.25%	  to	  0.5%	  over	  for	  foreign	  currency	  loans	  and	  from	  0.875%	  to	  2.5%	  (fixed-­‐rate)	  for	  yen-­‐denominated	  loans.	  All	  of	  these	  rates	  were	  reportedly	  lowered	  further	  for	  highly	  encouraged	  projects	  (JBIC	  2013).	  While	  China	  has	  a	  reputation	  for	  “cutthroat”	  finance,	  its	  OFDI	  loan	  rates	  vary	  widely,	  and	  many	  exceed	  Japan’s	  rates.	  	  	  
Comparison	  of	  Motives	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  break	  down	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  by	  sector	  and	  motive	  to	  compare	  it	  on	  a	  more	  detailed	  level	  with	  Japanese	  lending.	  Inter-­‐sectoral	  comparisons	  are	  difficult	  because	  of	  China’s	  lack	  of	  data.	  Some	  sectors	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  receive	  clear-­‐cut	  OFDI	  lending	  tied	  to	  specific	  projects	  (e.g.	  mining	  and	  oil),	  while	  manufacturing	  usually	  received	  “all	  of	  the	  above”	  loans	  for	  export	  credits,	  overseas	  investment	  and	  overseas	  contracting.	  Including	  these	  loans	  would	  overestimate	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  manufacturing	  and	  infrastructure	  sectors,	  while	  excluding	  them	  would	  underestimate	  these	  sectors.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  comparison	  with	  Japan,	  we	  applied	  a	  strict	  test	  that	  seemed	  closest	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  used	  by	  JEXIM—finance	  intended	  primarily	  to	  support	  OFDI—that	  disqualified	  the	  “all	  of	  the	  above”	  manufacturing	  loans.	  As	  a	  result,	  our	  sectoral	  analysis	  underestimates	  the	  amount	  of	  Chinese	  manufacturing	  lending.	  Solís	  (2003a)	  categorized	  Japan’s	  OFDI	  lending	  into	  three	  stages;	  the	  literature	  agrees	  that	  the	  first	  stage	  focused	  on	  natural	  resource	  acquisition	  (Farrell	  et	  al	  2004	  164;	  Komiya	  and	  Wakasugi	  1991	  51;	  Solís	  2003a).	  From	  1953	  to	  1970,	  JEXIM	  gave	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  While	  the	  OECD	  has	  banned	  subsidized	  export	  finance	  for	  fear	  of	  competition,	  it	  does	  not	  regulate	  OFDI	  
loans	  because	  there	  is	  no	  need—only	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  really	  use	  them.	  
	   13	  
35%	  of	  its	  loans	  for	  natural	  resource	  acquisition.8	  In	  addition,	  another	  34%	  went	  to	  the	  lumber	  and	  steel	  industries,	  largely	  to	  acquire	  raw	  materials	  (Solís	  correspondence;	  Solís	  2003a	  104).	  It	  was	  during	  this	  period	  that	  OFDI	  loans	  in	  the	  iron,	  steel	  and	  nonferrous	  metals	  sector	  reached	  55%	  of	  total	  manufacturing	  OFDI	  (Solís	  2003a	  106).	  Still,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Japan’s	  OFDI	  and	  OFDI	  lending	  in	  this	  period	  were	  miniscule	  compared	  to	  future	  stages.	  Japan	  lent	  twice	  as	  much	  in	  1973	  as	  it	  did	  in	  this	  entire	  period.	  Japan’s	  counterintuitive	  second	  stage	  began	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  when	  the	  government	  began	  paying	  to	  outsource	  industries.	  It	  gave	  loans	  to	  support	  “industrial	  adjustment,”	  or	  getting	  rid	  of	  industries	  that	  were	  on	  the	  way	  out	  anyways	  (Mah	  and	  Noh	  2012	  310).	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  the	  government	  recognized	  that	  Japan	  would	  not	  be	  competitive	  in	  the	  labor-­‐intensive	  textile	  industry.	  Preferring	  outsourcing	  to	  bankruptcy,	  JEXIM	  gave	  subsidized	  loans	  to	  help	  Japanese	  textile	  firms	  move	  to	  China	  and	  Southeast	  Asia,	  (Solís	  2003a	  105;	  Ogawa	  and	  Lee	  1996;	  Mah	  and	  Noh	  2012	  310).	  After	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  system	  in	  1972	  and	  the	  1973	  oil	  crisis,	  Japan’s	  metal	  and	  oil-­‐refining	  industries	  suddenly	  lost	  competitiveness.	  So	  from	  1971	  to	  1984,	  the	  majority	  of	  Japan’s	  manufacturing	  OFDI	  loans	  went	  to	  outsourcing	  unprofitable	  heavy	  industry.	  The	  chemicals	  and	  iron,	  steel	  and	  nonferrous	  metals	  sectors	  alone	  received	  over	  two	  thirds	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  for	  manufacturing,	  up	  from	  24.9%	  in	  the	  first	  period	  (Solís	  2003a	  105).	  	  In	  the	  third	  stage,	  from	  1985	  to	  1999,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  continued	  to	  use	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  outsource	  other	  “sunset	  industries.”	  As	  wages	  rose,	  low-­‐margin,	  low-­‐wage	  sectors	  began	  losing	  money,	  and	  the	  government	  pushed	  them	  overseas.	  	  OFDI	  loans	  for	  vehicle	  and	  electronics	  assembly	  rose	  from	  13.8%	  of	  manufacturing	  OFDI	  lending	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  to	  44.7%	  in	  the	  third	  (Solís	  2003a	  104).	  Heavy	  industry	  lategoers	  in	  the	  chemicals	  and	  iron,	  steel	  and	  nonferrous	  metals	  sectors	  added	  another	  41.0%.	  According	  to	  the	  literature,	  despite	  fears	  of	  “hollowing-­‐out,”	  Japan’s	  state	  support	  for	  outsourcing	  did	  not	  hurt	  its	  domestic	  economy	  (Solís	  2004).	  	  Beginning	  in	  the	  third	  stage,	  Japan	  also	  engaged	  in	  OFDI	  to	  tap	  into	  overseas	  markets	  and	  acquire	  technology,	  though	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  much	  OFDI	  lending	  went	  to	  support	  these	  efforts.	  Japan	  had	  large	  incentives	  to	  engage	  in	  market-­‐access	  FDI	  beginning	  in	  1977,	  when	  the	  U.S.	  banned	  TV	  imports	  from	  Japan.	  Similarly,	  in	  1981	  the	  U.S.	  placed	  a	  quota	  on	  Japanese	  car	  imports	  (Solís	  2004	  42).	  In	  the	  early	  1990s,	  Japanese	  companies	  used	  OFDI	  to	  “tariff-­‐hop”	  into	  Europe	  after	  the	  1992	  European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Calculated	  with	  data	  in	  Solís	  2004	  (40)	  and	  other	  data	  compiled	  by	  Solís.	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Community	  integration	  and	  into	  the	  U.S.	  after	  NAFTA	  in	  1994	  (Farrell	  et	  al	  2004	  172,	  Komiya	  and	  Wakasugi	  1991	  55).	  Even	  in	  China,	  much	  of	  Japan’s	  OFDI	  in	  the	  2000s	  went	  to	  open	  the	  Chinese	  market	  through	  joint	  ventures	  (Mah	  and	  Noh	  2012	  314).	  Recently,	  Japanese	  OFDI	  has	  also	  used	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  (M&A)	  to	  acquire	  foreign	  technology	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  traditional	  licensing	  method	  (Komiya	  and	  Wakasugi	  1991	  56;	  Farrell	  et	  al	  2004	  174).	  	  Korean	  OFDI	  lending	  began	  with	  the	  same	  first	  stage	  of	  acquiring	  natural	  resources.	  In	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  almost	  all	  OFDI	  went	  to	  acquire	  primary	  resources	  (Kim	  and	  Mah	  2006	  887).	  In	  1975,	  the	  government	  finally	  began	  granting	  OFDI	  permits	  for	  companies	  that	  needed	  to	  outsource	  to	  “regain	  international	  competitiveness”	  (UNCTAD	  2006	  208).	  Still,	  even	  into	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  it	  remained	  more	  concerned	  about	  preventing	  capital	  flight	  than	  promoting	  OFDI	  (Kim	  2000	  109;	  Kumar	  and	  Kim	  1984	  52).	  Over	  60%	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  from	  1976	  to	  1984	  still	  went	  to	  secure	  natural	  resources	  (Solís	  2004	  210).	  	  Like	  Japan,	  Korea	  then	  entered	  a	  stage	  of	  industrial	  adjustment,	  which	  began	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  In	  1985,	  Korea	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  (KEXIM)	  performed	  an	  about-­‐face	  and	  began	  giving	  FDI	  loans	  mostly	  to	  the	  manufacturing	  sector.	  Between	  1985	  and	  1997,	  manufacturing	  received	  89.8%	  of	  all	  FDI	  lending	  (Solís	  2004	  210).	  Once	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	  began	  in	  1997,	  KEXIM	  largely	  abandoned	  FDI	  lending	  in	  favor	  of	  its	  traditional	  export	  financing.	  Since	  KEXIM	  Annual	  Reports	  only	  disaggregate	  the	  sectors	  of	  export	  loans,	  not	  OFDI	  loans,	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  reliably	  compare	  the	  sectoral	  breakdown	  of	  China	  and	  Korea’s	  OFDI	  lending	  today.	  While	  Korean	  and	  Taiwanese	  companies	  have	  outsourced	  labor-­‐intensive	  industries	  
en	  masse	  and	  acquired	  foreign	  technology	  through	  M&A,	  they	  have	  done	  it	  mostly	  without	  government	  assistance.	  In	  the	  last	  decade,	  Korean	  companies	  have	  outsourced	  most	  labor-­‐intensive	  production	  to	  China,	  which	  currently	  absorbs	  most	  Korean	  OFDI	  (Athukorala	  and	  Hill	  2002;	  Kim	  and	  Mah	  2006	  883).	  Korean	  OFDI	  also	  focuses	  on	  M&A	  to	  gain	  foreign	  technology	  and	  open	  up	  new	  markets	  by	  jumping	  tariff	  barriers	  (Kim	  2000	  111).	  But	  despite	  the	  growth	  in	  outsourcing,	  tariff-­‐hopping	  and	  technology-­‐seeking	  OFDI,	  the	  state	  did	  not	  proactively	  push	  these	  motives	  with	  OFDI	  lending	  (Kim	  2000).	  The	  Chinese	  government	  and	  numerous	  scholars	  agree	  that	  China	  encourages	  OFDI	  to	  acquire	  primary	  resources,	  gain	  access	  to	  advanced	  technology,	  and	  enter	  foreign	  markets,	  but	  not	  to	  outsource	  dying	  industries.	  The	  existing	  studies	  on	  China’s	  OFDI	  draw	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  OFDI	  in	  general	  and	  in	  emerging	  economies.	  The	  international	  business	  literature	  on	  firm	  internationalization	  highlights	  four	  main	  motivations:	  outsourcing	  for	  cost	  reduction,	  resource	  acquisition,	  technological	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learning,	  and	  market	  entry	  (Buckley	  1976;	  Dunning	  1977).	  China	  scholars	  agree	  that	  outsourcing	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  factor	  in	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending.	  Although	  the	  government’s	  OFDI	  data	  is	  unusable	  due	  to	  tax	  havens,	  scholars	  have	  begun	  to	  use	  other	  OFDI	  sources	  to	  analyze	  the	  reasons	  for	  Chinese	  OFDI.	  They	  have	  published	  case	  studies,	  descriptions	  of	  overall	  trends,	  and	  quantitative	  analyses	  (Child	  and	  Rodrigues	  2005;	  Buckley	  2007;	  Deng	  2009).	  These	  studies	  conclude	  that	  China’s	  OFDI	  follows	  the	  latter	  three	  drivers	  above	  while	  they	  reject	  outsourcing,	  citing	  China’s	  relatively	  low	  labor	  costs	  (Zhang	  and	  Daly	  2011;	  Ye	  forthcoming).The	  Chinese	  government	  has	  confirmed	  the	  latter	  three	  motives	  in	  both	  its	  Five-­‐Year	  Plan	  for	  2010-­‐2015	  and	  in	  a	  joint	  notice	  by	  CHEXIM	  and	  China’s	  main	  economic	  planning	  agency,	  NDRC	  (NDRC	  and	  CHEXIM	  2004;	  Luo	  2010	  76).	  These	  scholars	  base	  their	  arguments	  about	  the	  government’s	  motives	  on	  OFDI	  figures,	  which	  represent	  the	  amalgamated	  priorities	  of	  China’s	  diverse	  companies,	  not	  the	  government’s	  intentions.	  In	  the	  interest	  of	  using	  available	  data,	  most	  studies	  rely	  on	  databases	  of	  China’s	  OFDI.	  Yet	  China’s	  OFDI	  comes	  from	  many	  different	  types	  of	  companies,	  including	  small	  and	  large	  private	  companies	  as	  well	  as	  local,	  provincial	  and	  national	  SOEs.	  Even	  the	  national	  SOEs	  do	  not	  act	  according	  to	  the	  central	  state’s	  priorities.9	  Thus,	  a	  study	  on	  how	  much	  companies	  are	  investing	  in	  particular	  countries	  and	  industries	  can	  only	  suggest	  the	  motives	  of	  the	  various	  companies,	  rather	  than	  the	  motives	  of	  the	  government.	  Existing	  studies	  do	  report	  on	  the	  government’s	  OFDI	  policy	  statements	  and	  policies,	  which	  include	  restrictions	  abolished,	  tax	  incentives	  created,	  loans	  encouraged	  and	  treaties	  signed.	  But	  since	  the	  government	  does	  not	  publish	  data	  on	  its	  OFDI	  lending,	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  government’s	  motives	  has	  not	  moved	  beyond	  policy	  descriptions	  and	  case	  studies.	  We	  assess	  the	  state’s	  actual	  motives	  by	  cataloguing	  its	  OFDI	  lending	  by	  sector	  and	  purpose	  and	  comparing	  them	  to	  Japan’s	  JBIC	  lending	  today	  and	  in	  the	  past.	  Today,	  JBIC	  provides	  a	  detailed	  sectoral	  breakdown	  of	  manufacturing,	  natural	  resource	  and	  other	  loans	  in	  its	  annual	  reports,	  and	  it	  was	  relatively	  straightforward	  to	  assign	  the	  Chinese	  loans	  to	  the	  same	  categories.	  The	  main	  difference	  lay	  in	  sectors	  like	  steel,	  since	  China’s	  steel	  companies	  are	  investing	  abroad	  in	  raw	  materials	  (iron),	  while	  Japan’s	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  building	  steel	  mills	  abroad.	  We	  categorized	  iron	  investments	  by	  China’s	  steel	  companies	  as	  Mining	  and	  Oil	  rather	  than	  Manufacturing.	  In	  Japan’s	  case,	  we	  had	  no	  details	  on	  the	  Japanese	  projects,	  and	  the	  reported	  totals	  for	  natural	  resource	  and	  manufacturing	  loans	  often	  overlapped.	  We	  had	  to	  make	  some	  educated	  guesses	  when	  simplifying	  JBIC’s	  sectoral	  breakdown.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  To	  complicate	  matters	  further,	  the	  central	  state	  itself	  does	  not	  speak	  with	  one	  voice.	  The	  major	  relevant	  
actors	  here	  include	  the	  Politburo	  Standing	  Committee,	  National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  Council	  
(NDRC),	  SASAC,	  banking	  sector	  leaders,	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  (MOFCOM).	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  As	  Table	  5	  shows,	  the	  main	  takeaway	  from	  China’s	  sectoral	  breakdown	  since	  2002	  is	  that	  the	  mining	  and	  oil	  sector	  remains	  completely	  dominant.	  The	  mining	  and	  oil	  sector	  absorbed	  roughly	  80%	  of	  China’s	  OFDI	  loans	  from	  2002	  to	  2012.	  Another	  12%	  went	  to	  infrastructure	  and	  4%	  to	  manufacturing.	  Services	  received	  just	  over	  1%,	  and	  agriculture	  and	  textiles	  received	  less	  than	  1%.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  the	  manufacturing	  share	  would	  have	  been	  roughly	  three	  times	  greater	  if	  we	  had	  counted	  “all	  of	  the	  above”	  loans	  designed	  primarily	  as	  export	  credits.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   Japan	   China	  
By	  sector	   Amount	   Percent	   Amount	   Percent	  
Mining	  and	  Oil	   $63,797	   45.3%	   $73,742	   79.94%	  
Agriculture	   $180	   0.1%	   $1,560	   1.69%	  
Textiles	   $421	   0.3%	   $40	   0.04%	  
Manufacturing	   $19,540	   13.9%	   $3,378	   3.66%	  
Infrastructure	   $19,050	   13.5%	   $10,928	   11.85%	  
Services	   $8,307	   5.9%	   $2,600	   2.82%	  
Other	   $29,393	   20.9%	   $0	   0.00%	  
Total	   $140,689	   100.00%	   $92,248	   100.00%	  
	  
Table	  5.	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese	  OFDI	  Lending	  By	  Sector,	  2002-­‐2012,	  in	  $	  millions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   Japan,	  1971-­‐1984	   China	  
By	  sector	   Amount	   Percent	   Amount	   Percent	  
Mining	  and	  Oil	   $2,693	   32.0%	   $73,742	   79.94%	  
Agriculture	   $118	   1.4%	   $1,560	   1.69%	  
Textiles	   $278	   3.3%	   $40	   0.04%	  
Manufacturing	   $5,184	   61.6%	   $3,378	   3.66%	  
Infrastructure	  
	   	  
$10,928	   11.85%	  
Services	  
	   	  
$2,600	   2.82%	  
Other	   $143	   1.7%	   $0	   0.00%	  
Total	   $8,415	   100.00%	   $92,248	   100.00%	  
	  
Table	  6.	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese	  OFDI	  Lending	  By	  Sector	  during	  Industrialization	  in	  $	  millions	   	  As	  seen	  in	  Tables	  5	  and	  6,	  Japan	  spread	  its	  OFDI	  lending	  out	  between	  sectors	  much	  more	  evenly	  than	  China,	  both	  historically	  and	  today.	  In	  the	  first	  stage	  from	  1953-­‐1970,	  mining	  and	  oil	  received	  the	  largest	  share	  at	  32%,	  followed	  by	  lumber	  at	  19%,	  steel	  at	  15%,	  and	  textiles	  at	  14%.	  From	  1971-­‐1984,	  steel	  moved	  into	  the	  top	  slot	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OFDI	   Ratio	  
	  Mining	  	   $57,760	   $101,640	   56.8%	  
	  Oil	  	   $45,850	   $148,530	   30.9%	  
	  Agriculture	  	   $1,560	   $12,310	   12.7%	  
	  Manufacturing	  	   $22,962	   $34,990	   65.6%	  
	  Infrastructure	  	   $13,593	   $18,220	   74.6%	  
	  Services	  	   $2,600	   $77,000	   3.4%	  
	  Total	  	   $144,366	   $399,780	   36.1%	  
	  
Table	  7.	  Chinese	  OFDI	  Lending	  as	  a	  Percent	  of	  OFDI	  By	  Sector,	  2002-­‐2012,	  in	  $	  millions	  
	  From	  Table	  7,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  Chinese	  government	  is	  pushing	  OFDI	  harder	  in	  some	  sectors	  than	  in	  others.	  The	  ratio	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  total	  OFDI	  varies	  from	  3%	  in	  services	  to	  75%	  in	  infrastructure.	  Chinese	  companies	  investing	  overseas	  in	  real	  estate,	  the	  financial	  sector,	  and	  agriculture	  are	  receiving	  little	  state	  support.	  At	  the	  other	  end,	  the	  state	  is	  heavily	  involved	  in	  supporting	  overseas	  manufacturing	  and	  infrastructure	  projects.	  Interestingly,	  mining	  receives	  almost	  twice	  as	  much	  support	  as	  oil.	  When	  compared	  to	  developing	  Japan,	  China	  is	  pushing	  most	  sectors	  quite	  vigorously.	  Japan’s	  average	  ratio	  was	  10%,	  and	  its	  “most	  extreme”	  support	  went	  to	  the	  mining	  sector	  from	  1953-­‐1970,	  with	  a	  loans-­‐to-­‐OFDI	  ratio	  of	  55%	  (Solís	  2003a	  106).	  In	  China,	  all	  sectors	  except	  services	  exceed	  Japan’s	  10%	  average.	  Three	  sectors	  exceed	  Japan’s	  all-­‐time	  high	  of	  55%.	  We	  also	  catalogued	  China’s	  stated	  motives	  for	  each	  of	  its	  individual	  OFDI	  loans	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  them	  to	  JEXIM’s	  three	  stages	  of	  lending.	  In	  our	  China	  search,	  loan	  descriptions	  included	  enough	  information	  to	  reliably	  determine	  whether	  the	  loan	  addressed	  natural	  resource	  acquisition,	  market	  access,	  technological	  learning	  through	  M&A,	  or	  industrial	  adjustment.	  While	  a	  bank	  may	  have	  had	  multiple	  reasons	  for	  providing	  an	  individual	  loan,	  we	  maintain	  that	  each	  loan	  had	  one	  of	  these	  four	  motives	  as	  its	  primary	  raison	  d’être.	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  same	  data	  was	  not	  available	  for	  Japan	  or	  Korea	  today.	  While	  JBIC	  offers	  data	  disaggregated	  by	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sector,	  neither	  JBIC	  nor	  KEXIM	  reports	  data	  on	  its	  motives	  or	  provides	  information	  on	  enough	  individual	  loans	  for	  us	  to	  make	  estimates.	  As	  with	  Japan	  and	  Korea’s	  first	  stages,	  China’s	  leading	  OFDI	  loan	  motive	  is	  natural	  resource	  acquisition.	  It	  is	  responsible	  for	  81%	  of	  China’s	  OFDI	  loans	  since	  2002.	  In	  the	  mining	  and	  oil	  sector,	  all	  but	  one	  loan	  was	  aimed	  at	  acquiring	  resources.	  The	  outlier,	  a	  $230	  million	  loan	  to	  Sinochem,	  went	  to	  acquire	  advanced	  oil	  drilling	  technology	  from	  Norway.	  While	  there	  were	  other	  loans	  funding	  acquisitions	  of	  developed	  country	  mining	  and	  oil	  operations,	  those	  operations	  were	  valuable	  for	  their	  resources	  rather	  than	  their	  technology.	  China’s	  81%	  exceeds	  the	  over	  60%	  of	  Korean	  lending	  that	  went	  to	  natural	  resource	  acquisition	  from	  1976	  to	  1984	  (Solís	  2004	  210),	  as	  well	  as	  Japan’s	  47%	  share	  for	  mining	  and	  oil	  loans	  in	  its	  modern-­‐day	  stage.	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  in	  China	  is	  still	  the	  basic	  acquisition	  of	  resources.	  China’s	  focus	  on	  OFDI	  lending	  for	  natural	  resource	  acquisition	  suggests	  that	  China’s	  overseas	  investments	  in	  natural	  resources	  are	  far	  from	  slowing	  down.	  	  As	  Solís	  (2003a)	  showed	  for	  Japan,	  OFDI	  lending	  leads	  OFDI.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  Chinese	  government	  is	  mounting	  a	  strong	  push	  for	  OFDI,	  and	  that	  Chinese	  companies	  are	  still	  in	  the	  process	  of	  reacting.	  It	  may	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  those	  who	  raise	  alarm	  over	  China’s	  growing	  natural	  resource	  OFDI	  that	  in	  fact	  this	  OFDI	  is	  likely	  to	  grow	  considerably.	  It	  is	  also	  apparent	  that	  China	  is	  not	  using	  its	  OFDI	  loans	  to	  fund	  “industrial	  adjustment.”	  In	  the	  entire	  textile	  sector,	  we	  found	  only	  one	  loan	  for	  $40	  million,	  to	  build	  a	  textile	  factory	  in	  Mauritius.	  CHEXIM	  justifies	  this	  loan	  by	  stating	  that	  it	  will	  improve	  overseas	  business	  management	  and	  aid	  economic	  development	  in	  Mauritius,	  with	  no	  hint	  of	  industrial	  adjustment.10	  All	  other	  manufacturing	  loans	  aimed	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  either	  new	  markets	  or	  advanced	  technology.	  It	  could	  be	  that,	  as	  was	  mostly	  the	  case	  for	  Korea,	  the	  state	  feels	  that	  sunset	  industries	  are	  already	  outsourcing	  smoothly	  enough	  on	  their	  own.	  Either	  that,	  or	  China	  is	  not	  so	  keen	  on	  seeing	  them	  go.	  This	  would	  be	  understandable	  given	  China’s	  regional	  inequalities.	  Far	  away	  from	  the	  East	  Coast,	  where	  rising	  wages	  are	  dragging	  down	  labor-­‐intensive	  industries,	  China’s	  West	  holds	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  workers	  willing	  to	  work	  for	  a	  fraction	  of	  East	  Coast	  wages.	  Rather	  than	  following	  Japan’s	  lead	  and	  helping	  East	  Coast	  companies	  move	  abroad,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  is	  attempting	  to	  coax	  the	  factories	  west	  through	  tax	  incentives	  and	  new	  infrastructure.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  CHEXIM	  2007	  Annual	  Report	  http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/annual/2007/2007nb36.shtml	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China’s	  second-­‐largest	  OFDI	  lending	  motive	  is	  increasing	  market	  share,	  surprisingly	  dominated	  by	  power	  companies.	  This	  motive	  comprised	  15%	  of	  total	  OFDI	  lending.	  Infrastructure	  projects	  accounted	  for	  81%	  of	  these,	  including	  ports,	  dams	  and	  power	  plants.	  Other	  than	  Three	  Gorges	  Group	  and	  China	  Merchants	  Group,	  the	  recipients	  were	  all	  major	  power	  companies:	  Huadian,	  Huaneng,	  and	  State	  Grid	  Corporation.	  Exporting	  power	  projects	  have	  received	  no	  attention	  in	  the	  literature	  thus	  far,	  though	  they	  do	  not	  fit	  neatly	  into	  the	  conventional	  explanation	  of	  tariff-­‐hopping.	  While	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  began	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  support	  tariff-­‐hopping	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  in	  response	  to	  new	  quotas	  and	  trade	  blocs,	  (Mah	  and	  Noh	  2012	  310,	  Kim	  2000	  109),	  it	  still	  has	  not	  become	  a	  major	  motive	  in	  the	  case	  of	  China.	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	  power	  company	  loans	  double	  as	  export	  loans	  for	  Chinese	  goods	  and	  services.	  Of	  the	  investments	  with	  known	  destinations,	  only	  a	  few	  are	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe.	  Others	  seek	  to	  build	  experience	  in	  developing	  markets.	  Infrastructure	  projects	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Indonesia	  involve	  a	  Build-­‐Own-­‐Operate-­‐Transfer	  (BOOT)	  model,	  requiring	  the	  company	  to	  own	  and	  operate	  the	  facility	  for	  a	  specified	  number	  of	  years	  before	  it	  sells	  back	  to	  the	  government.	  This	  could	  be	  beneficial	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  learning	  overseas	  business	  management,	  though	  that	  is	  not	  one	  of	  China’s	  sanctioned	  reasons	  for	  OFDI	  lending.	  Instead,	  we	  suggest	  that	  the	  banks	  are	  supporting	  these	  investments	  for	  the	  dual	  purpose	  of	  market	  access	  and	  export	  subsidy.	  Most	  of	  the	  loans	  are	  for	  solar,	  wind,	  hydropower	  and	  grid	  projects,	  which	  the	  parent	  companies	  will	  equip	  with	  Chinese	  solar	  panels	  and	  turbines.	  It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  China’s	  wind	  and	  solar	  manufacturing	  is	  in	  oversupply	  and	  needs	  added	  demand.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  an	  OFDI	  loan	  for	  a	  solar	  farm	  looks	  very	  similar	  to	  an	  export	  subsidy	  for	  solar	  panels.	  The	  third	  OFDI	  lending	  motive	  is	  acquiring	  advanced	  technology	  through	  M&A,	  an	  approach	  rarely	  employed	  by	  industrializing	  Japan	  or	  Korea.	  Chinese	  companies	  in	  the	  manufacturing,	  oil,	  auto	  and	  chemical	  sectors	  received	  $3.6	  billion	  in	  OFDI	  loans	  to	  acquire	  foreign	  companies	  with	  desirable	  technology.	  This	  comprises	  only	  4%	  of	  China’s	  total	  OFDI	  lending,	  but	  even	  so	  it	  represents	  a	  departure	  from	  its	  Asian	  counterparts.	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  industrialized	  by	  licensing	  advanced	  technologies	  from	  Western	  industry	  leaders,	  who	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  lead	  offered	  overly	  expensive,	  second-­‐rate	  technologies	  (Amsden	  1989	  150;	  Shinjo	  1988	  342).	  For	  a	  developing	  country	  drowning	  in	  foreign	  currency	  surpluses	  during	  a	  global	  economic	  downturn,	  acquiring	  Western	  companies	  at	  a	  discount	  does	  not	  sound	  like	  a	  bad	  alternative.	  One	  disadvantage	  of	  this	  strategy	  is	  stirring	  up	  anti-­‐Chinese	  sentiment	  in	  the	  host	  country.	  The	  U.S.	  Congress	  has	  blocked	  China’s	  attempts	  to	  purchase	  American	  oil,	  telecommunications	  and	  appliance	  companies,	  citing	  
	   20	  
national	  security	  threats.	  OFDI	  loans	  for	  technology	  acquisition	  would	  be	  twice	  as	  high	  if	  these	  loans	  had	  gone	  through.	  	  
Explaining	  China’s	  High	  Lending	  One	  major	  reason	  for	  China’s	  disproportionately	  high	  OFDI	  lending	  compared	  to	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  is	  that	  the	  Chinese	  state	  has	  more	  power	  to	  dictate	  how	  its	  borrowers	  use	  the	  money.	  Scholars	  have	  noted	  that	  one	  major	  stumbling	  block	  for	  OFDI	  loans	  has	  been	  the	  fact	  that	  governments	  cannot	  control	  the	  spending	  priorities	  of	  the	  borrowers.	  Governments	  would	  lend	  more	  if	  they	  could	  ensure	  that	  the	  companies	  would	  only	  use	  the	  money	  for	  the	  government’s	  stated	  goals	  (acquiring	  natural	  resources	  and	  foreign	  technology,	  increasing	  global	  market	  share	  and	  perhaps	  outsourcing	  sunset	  industries),	  but	  they	  cannot	  prevent	  companies	  from	  using	  the	  money	  to	  outsource	  or	  outcompete	  domestic	  industries	  the	  government	  wants	  to	  protect	  (Safarian	  1993,	  Solís	  2003b).	  While	  the	  “national	  champions”	  in	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  are	  privately	  held,	  the	  Chinese	  state	  is	  lending	  primarily	  to	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (SOEs).	  Through	  additional	  analysis	  of	  our	  database,	  we	  found	  that	  SOEs	  receive	  95-­‐97%	  of	  the	  total	  finance.	  This	  agrees	  with	  Dussel	  Peters	  (2012),	  who	  argues	  that	  SOEs	  are	  responsible	  for	  lion’s	  share	  of	  OFDI.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  China’s	  economic	  planners	  do	  not	  exercise	  perfect	  control	  over	  its	  SOEs.	  These	  SOEs	  range	  from	  nationally-­‐owned	  oil	  companies	  to	  locally-­‐held	  manufacturing	  companies.	  China	  scholars	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  Chinese	  government	  is	  not	  a	  monolith	  and	  it	  does	  not	  retain	  perfect	  control	  over	  the	  SOEs.	  In	  fact,	  Ye	  (forthcoming)	  argues	  that	  SOEs	  are	  investing	  abroad	  partly	  because	  by	  reinvesting	  company	  profits	  they	  can	  avoid	  paying	  dividends	  back	  to	  the	  state.	  	  Still,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  Chinese	  government	  can	  control	  the	  SOEs	  more	  easily	  than	  earlier	  developmental	  states	  could	  control	  their	  privately-­‐held	  national	  champions.	  The	  Communist	  Party	  appoints	  the	  corporate	  heads	  of	  these	  state-­‐owned	  companies,	  and	  accordingly	  these	  officials	  hold	  the	  government	  rank	  of	  “Minister.”	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  are	  certainly	  paying	  close	  attention	  to	  government	  policy	  (Chin	  2009).	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  national	  SOE,	  the	  State-­‐Owned	  Assets	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission	  (SASAC)	  owns	  a	  controlling	  portion	  of	  their	  shares	  (Reilly	  and	  Na	  2007).	  Even	  the	  private	  companies	  receiving	  3-­‐5%	  of	  the	  OFDI	  lending,	  including	  Huawei	  and	  Geely,	  are	  intimately	  tied	  to	  the	  state.	  Indeed,	  foreign	  governments	  consider	  Huawei	  to	  be	  so	  close	  to	  the	  Chinese	  state	  that	  they	  classified	  it	  a	  national	  security	  risk.	  NDRC,	  the	  economic	  planning	  giant	  that	  signed	  the	  notice	  encouraging	  OFDI	  lending	  with	  CHEXIM	  in	  2004,	  holds	  veto	  power	  over	  all	  major	  investment	  projects	  in	  China	  today.	  It	  also	  coordinates	  China’s	  economic	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restructuring	  process	  in	  general,	  giving	  it	  immense	  power	  to	  punish	  and	  reward	  companies.	  In	  general,	  this	  national	  regulatory	  framework	  has	  relaxed	  considerably	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Go	  Abroad	  policy	  (Reilly	  and	  Na	  2007).	  	  Since	  the	  Chinese	  state	  is	  lending	  to	  SOEs	  and	  close	  friends,	  it	  exercises	  far	  more	  control	  over	  their	  priorities,	  and	  thus	  can	  justify	  greater	  lending.	  	  China’s	  SOEs	  may	  not	  be	  dictating	  the	  government’s	  lending	  priorities,	  but	  so	  far	  neither	  has	  shifted	  away	  from	  natural	  resource	  acquisition.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  over	  70%	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  goes	  to	  natural	  resource	  acquisition.	  According	  to	  data	  from	  the	  Heritage	  Foundation,	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  by	  China’s	  SOEs	  is	  also	  concentrated	  in	  natural	  resource	  acquisition,	  including	  46%	  in	  energy,	  22%	  in	  mining,	  and	  5%	  in	  agriculture	  (Scissors	  2014).	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  government	  will	  continue	  to	  pattern	  its	  investment	  after	  the	  existing	  makeup	  of	  China’s	  OFDI,	  however.	  When	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  shifted	  from	  natural	  resource	  acquisition	  to	  industrial	  adjustment	  it	  happened	  abruptly	  rather	  than	  gradually.	  Japan’s	  abrupt	  shift	  responded	  to	  sudden	  global	  events,	  including	  the	  collapse	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  the	  oil	  crisis.	  China	  may	  encounter	  similar	  triggers.	  Or	  as	  China’s	  currency	  appreciates	  and	  its	  heavy	  industry	  stagnates,	  the	  government	  may	  gradually	  choose	  to	  shift	  its	  support	  to	  industrial	  adjustment,	  technology-­‐seeking	  M&A,	  tariff-­‐hopping,	  or	  other	  motives.	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  disproportionate	  Chinese	  lending	  results	  from	  Chinese	  companies	  needing	  greater	  state	  support	  because	  of	  limited	  access	  to	  private	  capital,	  as	  some	  have	  suggested.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  Western	  investors	  may	  have	  been	  more	  comfortable	  funding	  emerging	  Japanese	  and	  Korean	  private	  companies	  than	  they	  are	  funding	  Chinese	  SOEs	  today.	  Korean	  companies	  in	  particular	  sought	  out	  foreign	  loans	  to	  finance	  OFDI	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s.	  However,	  Kim	  (2000)	  points	  out	  that	  foreign	  finance	  allowed	  only	  the	  largest	  Korean	  business	  groups,	  or	  chaebol,	  to	  invest	  abroad.	  Even	  the	  wealthiest	  chaebol	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  host	  country	  finance,	  a	  precarious	  situation	  that	  almost	  bankrupted	  Daewoo	  when	  the	  Asian	  Crisis	  hit	  in	  1999.	  	  Indeed,	  we	  found	  that	  69%	  of	  China’s	  OFDI	  funding	  went	  to	  companies	  that	  have	  access	  to	  foreign	  capital.	  They	  sell	  shares	  on	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange,	  issue	  international	  dollar-­‐	  and	  Euro-­‐denominated	  bonds,	  and/or	  receive	  loans	  from	  syndicates	  of	  international	  banks.	  An	  additional	  6%	  sell	  shares	  on	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Stock	  Exchange.	  While	  all	  of	  these	  funding	  sources	  are	  dependent	  on	  both	  their	  economic	  performance	  and	  the	  implicit	  backing	  from	  the	  Chinese	  government,	  their	  access	  to	  foreign	  capital	  is	  at	  least	  as	  good	  as	  that	  of	  Korean	  and	  Japanese	  companies	  during	  equivalent	  stages	  of	  development.	  Thus,	  China’s	  high	  OFDI	  lending	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  stem	  from	  a	  need	  to	  compensate	  for	  external	  funding	  constraints.	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If	  anything,	  the	  explanation	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  opposite—that	  China	  gives	  more	  OFDI	  loans	  because	  it	  has	  fewer	  funding	  constraints,	  since	  the	  central	  bank	  is	  awash	  with	  savings	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves.	  China’s	  gross	  savings	  as	  a	  percent	  of	  GDP	  climbed	  from	  40%	  in	  2002	  to	  51%	  in	  2012.	  Over	  the	  same	  period,	  Japan’s	  savings	  fell	  from	  25%	  to	  22%	  and	  Korea’s	  rose	  from	  30%	  to	  31%.	  In	  addition	  to	  saving	  more	  than	  its	  Asian	  Miracle	  counterparts,	  China	  has	  the	  highest	  savings	  rate	  in	  the	  world.	  Its	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  have	  climbed	  to	  $3.8	  trillion,	  roughly	  three	  times	  as	  high	  as	  second-­‐place	  Japan.	  In	  2002,	  China’s	  ratio	  of	  reserves	  to	  GDP	  was	  15%,	  compared	  to	  17%	  for	  Korea	  and	  10%	  for	  Japan.	  In	  2012,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  China’s	  GDP	  more	  than	  quintupled,	  its	  reserves-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  reached	  40%,	  with	  Korea	  and	  Japan	  at	  27%	  and	  22%,	  respectively.	  This	  ratio	  is	  higher	  than	  at	  any	  time	  in	  its	  recent	  history,	  or	  in	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  Japan	  or	  Korea.	  Its	  significance	  is	  quite	  clear	  when	  one	  considers	  that	  Japan	  and	  Korea	  both	  limited	  OFDI	  lending	  until	  they	  had	  amassed	  significant	  forex	  reserves	  (Komiya	  and	  Wakasugi	  1991	  51;	  Kim	  2000	  109).	  OFDI	  lending	  only	  increased	  as	  the	  governments	  became	  confident	  in	  their	  reserves.	  China	  has	  reached	  this	  point	  much	  earlier	  in	  its	  development.	  With	  this	  rapid	  accumulation	  of	  savings	  and	  reserves,	  China	  has	  had	  to	  diversify	  its	  investment	  strategy	  away	  from	  U.S.	  debt.	  In	  2007	  it	  established	  China	  Investment	  Corporation,	  a	  $500	  billion	  sovereign	  wealth	  fund.	  But	  it	  has	  also	  sought	  to	  directly	  invest	  its	  dollars	  abroad.	  It	  seems	  highly	  plausible	  that	  this	  excess	  of	  foreign	  capital	  could	  explain	  the	  government’s	  proactive	  OFDI	  efforts,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  3158%	  ratio	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  total	  OFDI.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  Numerous	  studies	  compare	  the	  policies	  behind	  China’s	  rise	  to	  those	  of	  its	  “Asian	  Miracle”	  predecessors,	  including	  liberalization,	  inward	  FDI	  attraction	  and	  export	  promotion.	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  less	  conventional	  tool	  of	  outward	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (OFDI)	  promotion.	  Starting	  in	  the	  1950s,	  Korean	  and	  Japanese	  banks	  gave	  billions	  of	  dollars	  in	  loans	  to	  “national	  champion”	  companies	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  overseas	  investment,	  and	  until	  recently	  has	  remained	  the	  global	  leader	  in	  OFDI	  lending.	  Today,	  Chinese	  state-­‐owned	  banks	  are	  loaning	  billions	  to	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  to	  invest	  abroad	  as	  part	  of	  the	  government’s	  Go	  Global	  policy.	  By	  cataloguing	  loans	  to	  China’s	  leading	  companies,	  we	  estimate	  the	  total	  value	  of	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending	  from	  2002-­‐2012	  at	  $140	  billion.	  This	  is	  remarkably	  close	  to	  Japanese	  and	  Korean	  OFDI	  lending	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  As	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  OFDI,	  though,	  China’s	  lending	  is	  roughly	  55%	  higher,	  31%	  compared	  to	  under	  20%	  for	  Japan	  and	  Korea.	  It	  is	  higher	  than	  Japan’s	  most	  concentrated	  lending	  during	  industrialization.	  It	  appears	  that	  Chinese	  development	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banks	  are	  pushing	  OFDI	  more	  proactively	  than	  Japan	  ever	  did.	  Japan’s	  lending	  history	  suggests	  that	  increasing	  OFDI	  lending	  does	  increase	  OFDI.	  Thus,	  as	  more	  companies	  follow	  the	  Chinese	  state’s	  enthusiastic	  lead,	  we	  expect	  Chinese	  OFDI	  to	  greatly	  increase.	  The	  two	  chief	  lenders	  are	  China	  Development	  Bank	  (CDB)	  and	  China	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  (CHEXIM),	  “policy	  banks”	  created	  to	  support	  government	  policy	  rather	  than	  to	  attain	  commercial	  profits.	  Over	  95%	  of	  the	  loans	  go	  to	  China’s	  SOEs	  rather	  than	  private	  companies.	  China’s	  OFDI	  loans	  bear	  interest	  rates	  that	  are	  roughly	  equal,	  or	  if	  anything	  higher,	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  Japan.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  motives,	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan,	  the	  loans	  were	  designed	  first	  to	  acquire	  primary	  resources,	  then	  to	  outsource	  dying	  industries,	  and	  finally	  to	  enter	  foreign	  markets	  and	  gain	  access	  to	  advanced	  technology.	  The	  Chinese	  government	  and	  numerous	  scholars	  agree	  that	  China	  encourages	  OFDI	  for	  all	  of	  these	  motives	  except	  for	  outsourcing.	  These	  scholars	  base	  their	  arguments	  about	  the	  government’s	  motives	  on	  OFDI	  figures,	  which	  represent	  the	  priorities	  of	  China’s	  companies,	  not	  of	  the	  government.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  state’s	  own	  OFDI	  lending	  is	  a	  better	  measure	  of	  its	  motives.	  We	  use	  our	  OFDI	  loan	  database	  to	  evaluate	  both	  the	  sectors	  and	  motives	  behind	  China’s	  OFDI	  lending.	  We	  find	  that	  the	  mining	  and	  oil	  sector	  received	  80%,	  followed	  by	  infrastructure	  at	  12%	  and	  manufacturing	  at	  4%.	  In	  terms	  of	  motives,	  natural	  resource	  acquisition	  comprised	  81%	  of	  the	  loans,	  followed	  by	  15%	  for	  market	  entry	  and	  4%	  for	  advanced	  technology.	  These	  breakdowns	  show	  that	  China	  seeks	  to	  secure	  resources	  far	  more	  single-­‐mindedly	  than	  either	  Japan	  or	  Korea.	  Also,	  China’s	  market	  entry	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  developing	  power	  project	  expertise	  and	  supporting	  energy	  exports	  than	  it	  does	  with	  tariff-­‐hopping,	  unlike	  Japan	  and	  Korea.	  Finally,	  China’s	  M&A	  loans	  for	  advanced	  technology	  bypass	  the	  expensive	  foreign	  licensing	  process	  that	  Japanese	  and	  Korean	  firms	  underwent.	  	  	  We	  note	  two	  major	  reasons	  for	  China’s	  high	  (31%)	  ratio	  of	  OFDI	  lending	  to	  total	  OFDI.	  First,	  China	  has	  a	  greater	  incentive	  to	  give	  OFDI	  loans	  because	  it	  greater	  has	  more	  power	  to	  dictate	  how	  its	  borrowers	  use	  the	  money.	  Second,	  China	  has	  a	  greater	  capacity	  to	  give	  OFDI	  loans	  because	  it	  has	  significantly	  higher	  savings	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves.	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Appendix	  I:	  Complete	  list	  of	  Chinese	  OFDI	  finance	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Primary	  purpose:	  A=Natural	  resource	  acquisition,	  B=Technology	  acquisition,	  C=Market	  access,	  D=industrial	  adjustment	  	  Sources:	  see	  Appendix	  2	  
Number Parent company Project Year
1 Shanghai Baosteel Group 2003
2 Shanghai Baosteel Group 2012
3 Shanghai Baosteel Group 2010
4 China National Petroleum (CNPC) 2009
5 China National Petroleum (CNPC) 2005
6 China Minmetals Group 2005
7 China Minmetals Group 2007
8 China Minmetals Group 2009
9 TCL 2005
10 TCL 2005
11 Huawei Technologies 2004
12 Zijin Mining Group 2006
13 Zijin Mining Group 2008
14 Zijin Mining Group 2007
15 SAIC Chery Automobile 2005
16 SAIC Chery Automobile 2006
17 SAIC Chery Automobile 2008
18 Jiangxi Copper 2008
19 Aluminium Corporation of China (Chinalco) (Chalco)2008
20 Aluminium Corporation of China (Chinalco) (Chalco)2008
21 Aluminium Corporation of China (Chinalco) (Chalco)2007
22 Haier Group 2004
23 Wuhan Iron and Steel Co Ltd (Wisco) 2007
24 Wuhan Iron and Steel Co Ltd (Wisco) 2009
25 Wuhan Iron and Steel Co Ltd (Wisco) 2010
26 China National Chemical (ChemChina) 2006
27 China National Chemical (ChemChina) 2011
28 China National Chemical Engineering Group Corporation (CNCEC)2003
29 State Grid Corporation 2010
30 Chongqing Grain Group 2011
31 Goldwind Science and Technology Co Ltd2011
32 Goldwind Science and Technology Co Ltd2011
33 Aviation Industry Corporation of China 2011
34 Three Gorges Corporation 2012
35 Three Gorges Group 2012




40 Zhejiang Geely Holding Group (Geely Holding Group)2008
41 Zhejiang Geely Holding Group (Geely Holding Group)2013
42 China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinopec) 2002
43 China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinopec) 2004
44 China International Trust & Investment (CITIC)2004
45 CITIC, Anshan, Baosteel, Shougang, Taiyuan2011
46 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)2006
47 Sinochem 2003
48 Sinochem 2004
49 China Merchants Group 2012
50 Sinosteel 2005
51 Sinosteel 2008
52 Jiangsu Jinsheng Industry 2010
53 Anshan Iron and Steel 2010
54 Shenyang Machine Tools Co 2012
55 Dalian Wanda Group 2012
56 Shanxi Tianli Enterprises 2007
57 China National Machinery Industry Corporation2005
58 China National Technical Import and Export Corporation (CNTIC)2005
59 Wuxi Suntech Ltd 2010







































































































































Yes No Steel A SOE Y
Yes No Steel A SOE Y
Yes No Steel A SOE Y
Yes Yes Oil A SOE Y
Yes Yes Oil A SOE Y
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y
Yes No Manufacturing C SOE Y
Yes No Manufacturing C SOE Y
Yes No Infrastructure C PrivateY
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y?
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y?
Yes No Mining A SOE Y?
Yes No Auto C SOE N
Yes No Auto C SOE N
Yes No Auto C SOE N
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y?
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y?
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y?
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y?
Yes No Manufacturing C SOE Y
Yes No Steel A SOE N
Yes Yes Steel A SOE N
Yes No Steel A SOE N
Yes Yes Chemical B SOE N
Yes Yes Chemical B SOE N
Yes Yes Infrastructure C SOE N
Yes Yes Infrastructure C SOE N
Yes Yes Agriculture A SOE Y
Yes No Manufacturing C SOE Y
Yes No Manufacturing C SOE Y
Yes No Manufacturing C SOE Y
Yes Yes Infrastructure C SOE N
Yes No Infrastructure C SOE N
Yes Yes Infrastructure C SOE Y
Yes Yes Infrastructure C SOE Y
Yes Yes Infrastructure C SOE Y
Yes Yes Infrastructure C SOE Y
Yes Yes Auto B PrivateY
Yes Yes Auto B PrivateY
Yes No Oil A SOE Y
Yes Yes Oil A SOE Y
Yes Yes Oil A SOE Y
Yes Yes Steel A SOE Y
Yes Yes Oil A SOE Y
Yes Yes Oil B SOE Y
Yes No Chemical C SOE Y
Yes Yes Infrastructure C SOE Y?
Yes No Mining A SOE Y
Yes Yes Mining A SOE Y
Yes Yes Manufacturing B PrivateN
Yes Yes Steel A SOE N
Yes Yes Manufacturing B SOE N
Yes Yes Entertainment C PrivateN
Yes Yes Textiles D SOE N
Yes No Manufacturing C SOE N
Yes No Manufacturing C SOE N
Yes No Infrastructure C PrivateY
Yes Yes Mining A PrivateN
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Appendix	  2	  
	  Listed	  here	  are	  the	  most	  detailed	  and/or	  most	  reliable	  sources	  found	  for	  each	  loan	  (by	  loan	  number	  from	  Appendix	  1).	  	  	  
Loan	  1	  	  “CDB	  pledges	  financial	  backing	  for	  Baosteel’s	  international	  investments.”	  Steel	  Orbis	  	  website.	  Accessed	  4	  Apr	  2014	  at	  http://www.steelorbis.com/steel-­‐news/latest-­‐news/cdb-­‐pledges-­‐financial-­‐backing-­‐for-­‐baosteels-­‐international-­‐investments-­‐552365.htm	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